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Article 1 04( c) of the Maastricht Treaty 
and European Monetary Union: 
Does Ireland Hold the Key to Success? 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) was established in December of 1991.1 
Its initial goal was the achievement of a true union through the dis-
mantling of internal trade barriers by 1992, enabling Europe to assert 
itself as an economic power able to compete with Japan and the United 
States.2 In order to fully realize true union, the EU passed the Maas-
tricht Treaty, known officially as the "Treaty of the European Union 
and Final Act" (the Treaty).3 The Treaty aims to promote the "harmo-
nious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable, 
non-inflationary growth which respects environmental considerations, 
a high degree of convergence of economic performance, high employ-
ment levels, a high degree of social welfare, improvements in the 
standard ofliving and quality oflife, and economic and social cohesion 
and solidarity among the member states."4 
Article 104(c) of the Treaty (the Article), one of the provisions 
related to economic cohesion, provides for an enforcement mecha-
nism against states that do not comply with the economic targets set 
by the European Commission (the Commission)5 to achieve economic 
and monetary union (EMU) and a common European currency.6 Eco-
nomic union is integral to the creation of a true federation. 7 Thus, the 
1 Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1991-92, at 117, 
2 See Kathryn M, Conway, Note, The ECU: Prospects for a Monetary Union in the European 
Economic Community, 21 LAw & POL'y INT'L BUSINESS 273, 273 (1989), 
3 Treaty of the European Union and Final Act, 7 Feb. 1992 art. R, 311.L.M. 247, 330 [hereinafter 
Maastricht Treaty J. 
4 WILHELM NOLLING, MONETARY POLICY IN EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT 142-43 (1993). 
5 The European Commission is a body of representatives from the individual Member States 
whose responsibilities include: initiating and coordinating policies; implementing policies; and 
enforcing compliance with policies. SeeD. LASOK &J. W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW 
AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 105-09 (1973). 
6 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, art. 104(c). 
7 See id. The Treaty sets up several convergence criteria which must be met in order to advance 
toward European Monetary Union (EMU). See id. These criteria are related to the Member States' 
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Article is important because, during the process of economic integra-
tion, it gives several EU governmental bodies the power to issue sanc-
tions against Member States that do not comply with the terms of the 
Treaty relating to monetary union. When Ireland failed to attain the 
settled targets contained in the Article, however, the Commission waived 
the enforcement mechanisms contained in the Article during its meet-
ing in mid-1994.s In light of this development, the Article's future 
viability as an enforcement mechanism has become unclear and the 
attainment of EMU in the near future may be jeopardized. 
Part I of this Note examines the three steps outlined in the Treaty 
aimed at establishing EMU. Part II explores the mechanics of Article 
104(c) of the Treaty, the excessive debt provision, which is aimed at 
lowering the debts, rates of inflation and deficits of the Member States. 
Part III examines the conditions facing Ireland with respect to Article 
104(c) and how the EU has responded to those conditions. Finally, 
Part IV demonstrates how flexibility in interpreting the criteria and 
applying sanctions against countries like Ireland, which are making a 
good faith effort to meet the Treaty's convergence criteria, will help, 
not hinder, the progress of the EU. This note concludes that the EU 
erred in adopting a strict interpretation of the Article and should, 
instead, interpret Article 104(c) liberally in order to best achieve EMU. 
1. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE ROAD LEADING TO 
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
Monetary union was defined by the Delors Committee9 as a currency 
area in which economic and monetary policies are managed jointly 
with a view to attaining common macroeconomic objectives. lO The 
Delors Committee recognized three conditions necessary for monetary 
union: (l) the assurance of total and irreversible convertibility of 
currencies; (2) the complete liberalization of capital transactions and 
economic stability. See Coopers & Lybrand, EC Commentaries, Economic and Monetary Union, 
July 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Int'l Library, Euroscope File at p*6 [hereinafter Coopers & 
Lybrand]. 
8 See EMU: Ireland and Luxembourg Take Budget Honours, EUR. REp., July 7,1994, available in 
LEXIS, Europe Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Budget Honours]. 
9 The Delors Committee was established by the Hanover Summit which was comprised of the 
Central Bank Governors from the then 12 Member States with instructions to explore and 
formulate tangible steps toward economic and monetary union. See Nancy Louise Kessler, Note, 
Banking on Europe: 1992 and EMU, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. S395, S418-19 (1992). 
10 Jacques Delors, Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community, (June 
1989) 'll 22 [hereinafter Delors Report]. 
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the full integration of banking and other financial markets; and (3) 
the elimination of margins of fluctuation and the irrevocable locking 
of exchange rate paritiesY The Delors Report outlined a three step 
plan to achieve monetary union for the twelve (now fifteen) Member 
States of the EU beginning in July of 1990.12 The first stage included 
the institutionalization of the practice of "multilateral surveillance" 
within the Economic and Finance (ECOFIN) Council (the Council)13 
to cover all short and medium term aspects of economic and monetary 
policy,14 as well as the coordination by Member State governments of 
their monetary policies. 15 The second stage is the important transi-
tional stage to full economic and monetary union. 16 During this stage, 
each Member State is to get its "economic house in order" through a 
reduction in its fiscal deficit, its public debt and its rate of inflationP 
Finally, in the third stage, the Member States will set up an inde-
pendent European Central Bank, develop closely coordinated eco-
nomic and fiscal policies, and establish the European currency unit 
(ECU) as the irrevocable fixed currency of the EU.IS 
A. The First Stage of Economic and Monetary Union: Elimination of 
Obstacles to Integration 
In order to successfully complete the first stage of currency integra-
tion, the Delors Report, and subsequently the Treaty, mandated that 
obstacles to financial integration be removed, and cooperation on 
11 ld. 
12 See Coopers & Lybrand. supra note 7, at p*4. 
13 The Economic and Finance (ECOFIN) Council is responsible for regular examination and 
assessment of Member States' economic and monetary policy guidelines which are based on 
studies submitted to the Council by the State in question, and upon which the Council is invited 
to make recommendations. See id. at p*5. In doing this, the Council considers: the economic 
conditions, prospects and policies in the EU and the Member States; whether these individual 
policies are compatible with the EU taken as a whole; and the external economic environment 
and its interaction with the Union's economy. ld. Additionally, the Council has the power to 
formulate country-specific recommendations to correct any potential or actual economic devel-
opments in one or more Member States which threaten the EU's economy. ld. This power is 
conferred upon the Council by Article 104(c) of the Treaty and is based on standards set up in 
the protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty. Maastricht Treaty, supra 
note 3, art. 104(c), para. seven. 
14 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*9. 
15 Alan Riding, The European Summit Measured Steps Toward One Europe: What Was Decided, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at A18. 
16 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*9. 
17 See id. at p*6. 
18 See id. at p*8. 
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monetary policy be intensified. 19 This stage of EMU is complete.20 
Following the mandates from the Treaty, the EU dismantled controls 
over capital movements for eight of the Member States effective July 
1,1990.21 During this same period, an amendment to the "1964 Decision 
on cooperation between the Central Banks of the Member States"22 was 
passed to formalize cooperation procedures and to form the Commis-
sion of Central Bank Governors to oversee and coordinate monetary 
policy.23 This Commission's recommendations are not binding.24 In-
stead, their recommendations are passed on to the Council who may 
draft binding recommendations to correct any economic development 
in a Member State which threatens the economy of the EU and its 
progress toward a common European currency.25 
Results of the first stage have been disappointing.26 Although strides 
toward lowering inflation were taken, the public finances of the Mem-
ber States have deteriorated over the past three years.27 Much of 
the turmoil is attributable to the recent European recession.28 De-
spite the disappointing results of the first stage, however, the politi-
cal leaders of the various Member States are still committed to pursu-
ing EMU.29 
19 See Delors Report, supra note 10, at ~~ 31-32; see also Kessler, supra note 9, at 421. 
20 This first stage was completed on January 1, 1994. Janet Bush, Playing Politics While EMU 
Flies on a Wing and a Prayer, THE TIMES (London) ,Jan. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, 
Allnws File; see also NOLLING, supra note 4, at 146; Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*6. 
21 NOLLING, supra note 4, at 146. 
22 The 1964 Decision on cooperation between the Central Banks of the Member States was 
designed to formalize the cooperation procedures that had evolved between the Central Banks 
of the European Monetary System members. Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*5. The 
amendment strengthened the Commission of Central Bank Governors' mission to promote 
cooperation between the central banks of the Member States. Id. 
23Id. 
24Id. 
25 See id. 
26 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*5. 
27 See id. 
28 The recession which engulfed the European Union was part of the same one which gripped 
the world in the late 1980's and continued through 1993. See Gillian Tett, Fr Exporter, THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at 22; Peter Norman, Survey of World Economy and Finance, THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994, at 1. During this period, the EU was hit with high unemploy-
ment, with 18 million people out of work during the recession. Worldwide Slump Ending at Last 
says IMF: Canada to Lead Industrial Countries' Growth Again, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 29, 1994, 
at E4. 
29 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*5. For example, several member states have begun 
to ready themselves for convergence by preparing to make their central banks independent. Id. 
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B. The Second Stage of EMU: Economic Convergence 
EU Member States are currently undergoing the second stage of 
EMU.30 This stage began January 1, 1994, with the formation of the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI).3l During this second stage the 
Member States are expected to avoid excessive government deficits; in 
addition, they are expected to announce their plans for the eventual 
independence of their central banks.32 
The Treaty assigns a number of target criteria relating to economic 
convergence33 which each Member State is responsible for meeting: 
-Each Member State's annual inflation and long-term interest rates 
must be no more than 1.5 percent to two percent higher than the three 
best performing Member States; 
-Each Member State's fiscal deficit must be no more than three 
percent of its gross domestic product (GDP); 
-Each Member State's debt-to-income ratio must not exceed sixty 
percent of its annual budget; and 
-Each Member State must not have devalued its currency under the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism34 within the intervening two years.35 
The EU has experienced some problems with these convergence 
criteria. First, a world-wide economic recession during the period prior 
to the implementation of the second stage slowed the economies of 
the Member States.36 Second, the convergence criteria are difficult to 
30 See id. at p*6. 
31 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 10ge-f. The European Monetary Institute (EMI) is the 
forerunner of the European Central Bank which will be the central bank for the EU and will be 
established during the third stage of EMU. See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*9. The 
EMI is entrusted to provide for all relevant technicalities necessary to EMU and with coordinating 
closer cooperation between the central banks of the individual Member States. See NOLLING, supra 
note 4, at 146. Additionally, the EMI will playa large role in evaluating the progress made toward 
EMU (i.e., setting the convergence criteria mentioned in the Treaty of Maastricht). See id. 
32 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*6. 
33 Economic convergence is the process whereby the 15 Member States of the European Union 
are supposed to move progressively toward the economic virtue required for membership in the 
EMU. Lionel Barber, Not a Bible, But a Primer for Single Currency, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, May 31, 
1995, at 2. 
34 The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) is designed to keep the currencies of the Member 
States aligned. Kevin Muehring, EC: EMU's Bitter Medicine - Tough Rules May Discourage Mem-
bership, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, April 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File. 
The ERM is a central exchange rate set in ECUs, that serves as the basis for calculating exchange 
rates among the member currencies. Kessler, supra note 9, at S420. 
35 Treaty of the European Union and Final Act, 7 Feb. 1992, Protocol on the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty Protocol]. 
36 See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 118. 
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meet.37 These criteria, however, are necessary to achieve the main goal 
of the second stage of monetary convergence: attaining a sustainable 
financial position for the EU Member States.38 
Recognizing that the convergence criteria are difficult to meet, the 
drafters of the Treaty designed a flexible timetable for entry into the 
third stage.39 If a majority of the Member States meet the convergence 
criteria, the EU can decide by a two-thirds majority to form a single 
currency and central bank on January 1, 1997.40 Even if those condi-
tions are not met, however, the ecu will be automatically implemented 
on January 1, 1999 with the regional central bank in place six months 
earlierY The States must still meet the convergence criteria if they are 
to take part, but any number of qualifYing States can adopt a single 
currency without a further ruling by the EU.42 Because this adoption 
procedure would seem to leave the door open for Member States to 
avoid meeting the criteria, the EU created Article 104(c) to temper or 
eliminate this practice.43 
II. THE MECHANICS OF ARTICLE 104(c) 
Article 104(c) of the Treaty, commonly known as the "excessive 
deficit reduction provision," sets controls and provides the Council 
with the power to issue sanctions and recommendations to Member 
States who do not meet the criteria of the protocol annexed to the 
Treaty (the protocol).44 Paragraph six of Article 104(c) states, "The 
37 See Muehring, supra note 34. 
38 The Maastricht Agreement on Economic Union, WORLD ECON. OUTLOOK (Int'l Monetary Fund), 
1992 available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File. "Sustainable financial position" is defined as 
a general government deficit no greater than three percent of GDP and a ratio of public debt to 
GDP of no more than 60 %. ld. 
39 See Riding, supra note 15, at AI8. 
40 ld. At a meeting of the EU finance ministers in Luxembourg, 1997 was effectively ruled out 
as the EMU launch date in favor of 1999. Lionel Barber, UK Well Placed to Clear EMU Hurdles: 
Finance Ministers Rally Behind 1999 as Launch Date for Single EU Currency, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 
June 20, 1995, at 2. 
41 Riding, supra note 15, at A18. 
42ld. 
43 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, art. 104(c). 
44 See id.; see also Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*8. If a Member State does not fulfill 
the ratio of government deficit to GDP (it must not exceed three percent at market prices) and 
the ratio of government debt to GDP criteria (it must not exceed 60 at market prices) then the 
Commission of Central Bank Governors may prepare a report to be given to the ECOFIN Council 
which decides whether any excessive deficit exists. Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*7, p*8. 
If the Council decides that one does exist and the Member State persistently fails to act on the 
Council's recommendations, the Council can decide whether to take one of several measures. ld. 
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Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation 
from the Commission, and having considered any observations which 
the Member State concerned may wish to make, decide after an over-
all assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. "45 Paragraph seven 
states, "Where the existence of an excessive deficit is decided according 
to paragraph six, the Council shall make recommendations to the 
Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an 
end within a given period."46 Although these sections describe how the 
enforcement mechanism is to operate, neither paragraph mandates 
enforcement of the criteria outlined in the protocol;47 instead, the 
decision whether to proceed with sanctions is left to the discretion of 
the Council, according to paragraph twO.48 
Although the European Commission has decided to construe the 
criteria strictly, their absolute nature is questioned.49 Commentators 
wonder whether "the convergence criteria require an end result smack 
on target ... or whether a country will be admitted to stage three if it 
is simply on a trend moving toward them. "50 Thus, the provisions of 
the Article and the protocol are open to a variety of interpretations 
which may lead to disputes over how to apply them.51 
at p*8. These measures include: requesting the Member State to publish additional specified 
information before issuing bonds and securities; requesting the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
to reconsider its lending policy; requesting that the Member State make a non-interest bearing 
deposit of an appropriate size with the Union until the excessive deficit has been corrected; or 
imposing fines. Id. 
45 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, art. 104c, para. six. 
46Id. at para. seven. 
47Id. at para. two. 
48 Paragraph two, in relevant part, states: 
Id. 
The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the 
stock of government debt in the Member States with a view to identifYing gross errors. 
In particular it shall examine compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of the 
following ... criteria: (a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit 
to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless ... the excess over the 
reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the 
reference value; (b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product 
exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching 
the reference value at a satisfactory pace. 
49 Nathaniel C. Nash, To Calm Markets, Europe Backs Plan for 1 Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
1995, at D2; Muehring, supra note 34. 
50 Muehring, supra note 34. 
51 See Alan Cowell, Europe's Dream of a Common Currency: A German Warning Shot, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 1995, at A13. 
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III. THE CASE OF IRELAND 
Ireland has come a long way in the past decade toward fulfilling the 
convergence criteria outlined in the Treaty.52 In 1985, for example, 
Ireland did not fulfill any of the criteria.53 In contrast, Luxembourg 
and the Federal Republic of Germany fulfilled all of the criteria, and 
several other Member States fulfilled two ofthe four criteria. 54 In 1993, 
however, Ireland fulfilled two of the requirements, while only France 
and Luxembourg fulfilled all of the criteria. 55 
Ireland has consistently improved its record.56 Its public debt has 
declined from 116 percent in 1987 to ninety-three percent in 1994.57 
Although a ninety-three percent public debt is far above the sixty 
percent limit set by the Treaty, this large reduction strongly demon-
strates a movement toward eventually meeting the criteria.58 Addition-
ally, although Ireland has not fulfilled the inflation criterion,59 its 
inflation rate is close to the 1996 target rate of between two and three 
percent for the Union and each Member State.5O Moreover, Ireland is 
the only country whose indebtedness has fallen since 1989.61 Finally, 
Ireland's public deficit does satisfy the debt criterion set out in the 
Treaty.62 
Although Ireland's trend toward meeting the criteria appears prom-
ising, Ireland still has met only two of the four criteria.63 Therefore, 
under the enforcement provisions of the Treaty, Ireland, as well as the 
52 See NOLLING, supra note 4, at 168. 
53Id. 
54Id. 
55Id. At the same time, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom had fulfilled three of the 
criteria; Belgium and Netherlands (in addition to Ireland) fulfilled two of the four criteria. Id. 
56 Budget Honours, supra note 8. 
57Id. 
58 See Maastricht Treaty Protocol, supra note 35. 
59 See id.; Muehring, supra note 34. This is a relative, rather than an absolute criterion, which 
is determined by taking the average inflation rates of the 12 Member States and adding 1.5% to 
it. EU: Commission Approves Its Recommendation on Broad Guidelines of Economic Policies, AGENCE 
EUROPE, May 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Economic 
Policies]; see Muehring, supra note 34. This provision is problematic because States such as 
Germany fear some of its economically weaker colleagues will use this loophole to have a higher 
rate of inflation and drive up the average inflation rate, thereby improving things for the stronger 
performers who may become less virtuous. See Muehring, supra note 34. 
60 Economic Policies, supra note 59. 
61 Budget Honours, supra note 8. 
62 See id. Ireland's debt is below three percent of its GDP which is the limit set by the Treaty. 
See id. 
63 See NOLLING, supra note 4, at 168. 
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other nine countries failing to meet all of the criteria, should have 
been reprimanded.64 Ireland, however, was excused, much to the dis-
may and disappointment of several of the other Member States, who 
were reprimanded despite exhibiting progress toward fulfilling the 
convergence criteria.65 
IV. THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE OF 
ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE AND EMU 
An expected consequence ofIreland's preferential treatment by the 
Council is resentment from the other Member States who also failed 
to achieve the necessary economic levels and were subsequently repri-
manded.66 Germany, which was considered for exemption but insisted 
on being put on report with the other non-complying Member States, 
is especially critical of the Council for exempting Ireland.67 Given the 
Member States' discontent with the decision of the Council not to 
impose sanctions on Ireland pursuant to the terms of the Treaty, the 
ability of Article 104(c) to act as a viable enforcement mechanism is 
questionable. 68 
The Council may have unwisely compromised the power of Article 
104(c) at the very time when a strong enforcement mechanism is 
necessary for the movement toward the third stage of European cur-
rency integration.69 As a result, some of the less economically stable 
Member States may try to avoid meeting the criteria altogether in 
expectation of the automatic implementation of the ECU in 1999.70 
Not only would this delay the installation of the ECU as the common 
currency of the EU, it may also mean that at the time of its entrance 
some of the Member States' economies may not meet the stability 
requirements for complete integration.71 For these reasons, it is not 
surprising that the European Commission has since decided to inter-
pret the criteria strictly. 72 
64 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, art. 104(c), para. 3; NOLLING supra note 4, at 16S. 
65 EU Monetary Committee Approves Excessive Debts Reports, THE REUTERS EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY REpORT (Reuters Limited), Sept. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File 
[hereinafter EU Monetary Committee]; see also Budget Honours, supra note S. 
66 See EU Monetary Committee, supra note 65. 
67 [d. 
68 See Muehring, supra note 34. 
69 See id. 
70 See Riding, supra note 15, at AIS. 
71 See id.; see also Coopers and Lybrand, supra note 7, at p*9. 
72Nash, supra note 49, at D2. 
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The Council's treatment of Ireland demonstrates, however, that Ar-
ticle l04(c) does allow the Commission to interpret the criteria liber-
ally and allows the Council, in its discretion, to excuse Member States 
who show a strong trend toward meeting the convergence criteria of 
the "excessive deficit reduction" procedure.73 Contrary to some of the 
views stated above, a liberal interpretation may act to speed, rather 
than threaten, the movement toward EMU because more states will be 
permitted to begin the third stage even though they have not met all 
of the convergence criteria. Some commentators feel this result is 
desirable because they see no absolute economic rationale for the 
convergence criteria.74 Rather, the criteria represent the Union average 
for each of the economic indicators at the time of negotiations.75 Thus, 
contrary to the opinion of the ministers of the Commission, there is 
no compelling need to stricdy adhere to the criteria. Rather, a demon-
stration of movement toward the criteria may be a better standard than 
the criteria themselves. 76 
Some of the fears ofthe Commission, however, are reasonable.77 For 
instance, decisions concerning the level of strictness used in evaluating 
each Member State's economic situation with regard to the conver-
gence criteria are political decisions.7s Some States want the criteria to 
be interpreted loosely, while others, such as Germany, insist on strict 
standards.79 
Allowing the Council a large degree of discretion to exempt Member 
States based on mere movements toward fulfilling the criteria, however, 
may unreasonably endanger the future of EMU because it too consists 
of politicians who may be swayed by public sentiment in their respec-
tive countries.so Although the Treaty gives the leaders of the Council 
discretion to decide whether to sanction a Member State, this discre-
tion may be economically damaging to EMU because EMU requires 
73 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, art. 104(c), para. 2; see also Budget Honours, supra note 8. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. Additionally, another commentator noted that the economic targets are not absolute; 
a movement toward them may be sufficient. See Barber, supra note 33. 
76 See Central Banks' Status, Budget Deficits Concern Officials Mulling Monetary Union, BNA 
INT'L Bus. AND FIN. DAILY, Nov. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, World library, Allnws File [here-
inafter Central Banks]. 
77 See Nash, supra note 49, at D2. 
78 NOLLING, supra note 4, at 172. "Almost an the Member States (with the sole exception of 
Greece) would stand a chance of entering into EMU 'if the conditions are interpreted with a 
certain degree of generosity.'" Id. 
79 See Muehring, supra note 34. 
80 See NOLLING, supra note 4, at 172. 
1996] ARTICLE 104(c) 257 
strict criteria if the EU is to emerge with a strong and stable common 
currency.8! In fact, before the Treaty establishing the convergence 
criteria was enacted, the De10rs Report stated that such criteria and 
their enforcement were necessary "to impose constraints on national 
budgets to the extent to which this was necessary to prevent imbalances 
that might threaten monetary stability. "82 Thus, interpreting the Treaty 
to allow a good deal of discretion may be damaging to EMU in the 
long run and is counter to the intent of its drafters.83 
On the other hand, the EU's current interpretation is also poten-
tially troublesome. From a practical standpoint, achieving the crite-
ria may prove to be impossible or exceedingly dangerous for certain 
States' economies.84 Some of the Member States' economies are not 
currently strong enough to implement a program of reducing their 
inflation rates and cutting their budget deficits.8s Such high criteria 
coupled with a recession-wracked Europe could be problematic.86 This 
may result in a long period of low growth because of the fiscal tight-
ening necessary to meet the strict criteria, especially those involving 
debt and inflation.87 Thus, instead of endangering economic stability, 
giving the Council a good degree of discretion may actually be a stabiliz-
ing force. 88 Additionally, programs to achieve convergence would be 
strongly "antigrowth" and thus detrimental to the national economies 
of the Member States.89 Weak national economies may, in turn, cause 
political unrest and revolutions and may even result in the ousting of 
Unionist leaders,90 bringing a wave of nationalists into power in some 
of the Member States.9! Anti-Unionist sentiment could grow in the 
81 See PETER B. KEMEN, EMU AFTER MAASTRICHT 79 (1992). Fiscal convergence is needed to 
stave off political and market pressures. See id. 
82 Delors Report, supra note 10, at 11 59. 
83 Nailing argues that the convergence criteria were debated and adopted after a period of 
intense and difficult negotiations and that, therefore, they were meant to be more absolute than 
the alternative interpretation would allow. See NOLLING, supra note 4, at 172. 
84 See KEMEN, supra note 81, at 78. 
85 See id. 
86Id. 
87 Steven Greenhouse, The European Summit; Europe's Pact on Money Seen as Business Boon, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, atAI8. There is fear that this process oflowering inflation and slashing 
budget deficits could cause a lot of economic hardship in the European Union. Id. 
88 See Central Banks, supra note 76. 
89 See id. 
90 See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 118-120. For example, Prime Minister John Major delayed 
ratification until his government had regained the voters' confidence. Id. 
91 See Muehring, supra note 34. 
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wake of fiscal tightening and the higher unemployment resulting from 
the projected decade of low growth during the drive to convergence.92 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The convergence criteria maintained in the Treaty must be followed 
in order for EMU to occur, and for the ECU to be established as the 
currency of the EU. The convergence criteria, however, should not be 
interpreted as absolute goals. Such an interpretation may result in 
economic recessions or depressions with high unemployment, social 
and political unrest, and possibly revolution in several of the Member 
States. These situations would endanger the future of the EU. Addi-
tionally, the strict convergence criteria would be virtually impossible 
for every State to attain. 
The Commission should allow the Council to construe the conver-
gence criteria of Article I04(c) liberally. By using evidence that a 
Member State is moving toward meeting the convergence criteria, the 
Council should be allowed to determine whether the Member State 
has improved enough to avoid sanctions or other penalties. Such a view 
is consistent with paragraph two of the Article and would not under-
mine the legal mandate given to the Council by paragraphs seven and 
eight of Article I04(c). Therefore, in cases such as Ireland, where the 
Member State has shown progress toward meeting the convergence 
criteria, the Council should have legal authority to use discretion to 
excuse such a State from sanctions. Such a move will apply to, and 
eventually benefit, each Member State through the attainment of EMU. 
Thus, each State should be amenable to this interpretation. In conclu-
sion, although effective debt-reduction is integral to EMU, the Com-
mission should not read the Treaty so strictly as to undercut its eventual 
success. 
Joshua M. Wepman 
92 See id. Unemployment in the EU stands at 11 % (compared to six percent for the United 
States) and the projected growth of the developing world's economies make the future for the 
EU very uncertain. Norman, supra note 28, at 1. 
